PhD PDF

MOQ Textbook PDF

Selections from the AHP transcript

MOQ Summary

 


MOQ Conference Papers

Robert Pirsig's Welcome Speech

Dr McWatt's Handout

Professor Gurr's Handout

Ian Glendinning's Paper

David Buchanan's Paper

Mark Maxwell's Paper

Mati Palm-Leis's Paper

Gavin Gee-Clough's Paper

 


Other MOQ Papers

The MOQ & Time

The MOQ & Education

Pirsig on Copleston

Pirsig and Pragmatism

Chai at the Lazy Lounge

 

 

 

Brief notes on the tetralemma

by Paul Turner

January 2006



I think the tetralemma is best understood within the context of the Buddhist doctrine of two truths. The two truths are typically designated ‘conventional’ and ‘ultimate’.

Conventional truth applies to facts about the everyday reality of things, people and events. It is designated conventional in the sense of being the product of human interests and dispositions and does not correspond to anything independently or inherently true.

Ultimate truth is inexpressible in the sense that, in the absence of convention, there is no candidate for metaphysical-strength predication, including the ascription of existence/non-existence itself. Significantly, both conventional and ultimate truth has the same consequence – nothing can be said to exist by virtue of its own essence.

The tetralemma is comprised of four propositional formulations expressed positively or negatively. Where x is any proposition and –x is its negation, a positive tetralemma takes the form of:

x
-x
Both x and -x
Neither x nor -x

I think the positive tetralemma is an expression of the conventional validity of the two truths. The positive import of the two truths is that whilst it is stated that nothing is inherently real, i.e., nothing exists by virtue of its own independent essence, the familiar everyday world is, nonetheless, conventionally real and exists in a way which does not contradict experience. With this acceptance of conventional truth we are not left with an absurd conception of reality in which nothing exists in any sense whatsoever. Thus the contradictory standpoints of (naïve or philosophical) reification and nihilism are repudiated in favour of a ‘middle way’. The four formulations of propositions are traditionally presented in an order in which each view presents a progressively better expression of the middle way perspective whilst each is valid with qualification. Constrained by usual proofs, then, a positive tetralemma therefore permits and commits one to state that, e.g.:

The self is real (conventionally true, i.e., it exists in a dependent reality along with everything else we derive from experience)

The self is not real (ultimately true, i.e., it has no essence)

The self is both real and not real (conventionally real but ultimately unreal)

The self is neither real nor not real (neither ultimately real nor completely nonexistent)

*(I should note here that there is some dispute over whether Siddhartha Gautama endorsed the use of the positive tetralemma, but Nāgārjuna is less controversially interpreted as doing so.)

A negative tetralemma takes the form of:

Not x
Not -x
Not (x and -x)
Not (neither x nor -x)

The negative tetralemma is the self destructing logic of the ultimate truth (the emptiness of emptiness!) which denies the validity of any philosophical assertion of any kind including that of the attribution of existence and non-existence to anything. The import of the negative tetralemma is that it ultimately denies its own validity as well as that of the doctrine of two truths which is itself designated a conventional truth.

To put this in the context of the MOQ, conventional truth applies to static reality and its difference from and relationship to Dynamic Quality. As such, the positive tetralemma would be used to express the reality of subjects, objects, and so on and their strictly static existence whilst acknowledging their lack of individual essence entailed by their dependence on Dynamic Quality. Ultimate truth thus applies to the pre-intellectual ‘perspective’ of Dynamic Quality. The negative tetralemma would be used to prevent any intellectual treatment of Dynamic Quality as a putative metaphysical ‘entity’ of which properties and attributes may be predicated.

An example of a positive tetralemma, in MOQ terms, is:

The self is real (i.e., it exists in static reality along with everything else we derive from experience)

The self is not real (from a Dynamic perspective)

The self is both real and not real (it is real from a static perspective but not from a Dynamic perspective)

The self is neither real nor not real (neither ultimately real from a Dynamic perspective nor completely non-existent from a static perspective)

The negative tetralemma is a hard-nosed formulation of the inexpressibility of Dynamic Quality. An example would be its treatment of the proposition that "Dynamic Quality exists in time."

"Dynamic Quality exists in time" should not be asserted.

"Dynamic Quality does not exist in time" should not be asserted.

"Dynamic Quality both does and does not exist in time" should not be asserted

"Dynamic Quality neither does nor does not exist in time" should not be asserted

The negative tetralemma is purely about what can't be said about Dynamic Quality and, ultimately, nothing can be said. But even one who is aware of that may make mistakes. I think the fourth lemma is the most common mistake that even the most dedicated mystic may make but is avoided by a thoroughgoing application of the negative tetralemma. In this case the fourth lemma implies the independent existence of time to which Dynamic Quality can be propositionally related.

 


Imagine